Abstract-Base on the principal-agent theories, this paper, from the angle of institutional economics, compares the optimal incentive contract on college English teachers under single-period moral hazard and under repeated moral hazard and introduces tenure contract in the model of repeated moral hazard. Our study finds the following results: (1) in the pretenure period under tenure contract with repeated moral hazard, the principal pays less to college English teachers to promote their incentive of hard-working in scientific research than in the case of single-period moral hazard; (2) college English teachers with tenure are much more difficult to be stimulated to work hard in scientific research and the college management layer has to pay much more to them for their hard work in academic field; (3) tenure system is cost-efficient in the pre-tenure period but is not necessarily cost-efficient in the tenure period.
INTRODUCTION
College English teachers are responsible for the teaching of general English skills in colleges and universities and they are frequently found to pay much attention and importance to English teaching but neglect the academic research in English language. There are many actual reasons: first, in most colleges and universities, college English teachers are pitched as teachers for common required course and academic research is not their ground work; second, it is much more difficult for college English teachers to publish their papers or reports on journals, newspapers, etc. as there are less journals in the field of English language than in other discipline fields; third, there is a lack of incentive scheme to stimulate college English teacher to work hard in scientific research.
However, it is difficult to design a proper incentive scheme for college English teachers to work hard in scientific research as there is always asymmetric information between the college management layer and the English teachers. To solve this problem, this paper will investigate into the incentive scheme for college English teachers to promote their effort in scientific research.
II. THE MODEL
There is typical principal-agent problem between the teachers and the management layer of colleges and universities, which originates from the asymmetric information between the teachers and the college management layer. The asymmetric information between the two can be categorized into two types: one the one hand, teachers know well their own type (hardworking or effortless) while the management layer does not possess enough information about their types; one the other hand, the effort devoted by the teachers to scientific research cannot be easily measured and the management layer have to substitute the output of scientific work for the teachers" effort as the effort cannot be observed easily.
A. Hypotheses of the Model
In our model, suppose that the teachers are homogeneous, namely the asymmetric information about the teachers" effort types is neglected and only the asymmetric information of teachers" effort is taken into consideration. Suppose there are two possible effort levels of the teachers, denoted by . In addition, the reserved utility of college teachers is set at zero.
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B. Optimal Incentive Contract under Single-Period Moral Hazard
College English teachers generally attach much more importance to English teaching than to English academic research. Besides, the scientific research in English is much more difficult to be published in academic journals and it seems that college English teachers are not provided enough incentive to devote themselves in scientific research. In view of this situation, moral hazard problem is unavoidable under asymmetric information as the effort of college English teachers cannot be easily observed and accurately measured. College English teachers are apt to taking opportunistic actions and being indolent on scientific research. Therefore, the management layer should design an incentive mechanism to promote teachers to pay more attention to scientific research. The programming problem of the management layer is:
     Where IR and IC respectively represents the participation constraint and incentive compatible constraint of the agent (college English teachers).
To guarantee the problem a concave programming, we change the null programming (P) through variable substitution. Let 
.    measured by utility) and entail them part of risks, which is coordinated with the practice. In fact, the academic achievements of college teachers are encouraged and rewarded and are essential for their promotion of professional title. Otherwise, college teachers may lose their scientific laboratories, scientific sponsors or even their administrative positions, of course the wages will be reduced.
C. Optimal Incentive Contract Under Repeated Moral
Hazard If the career of one college English teacher can be divided into two periods, the incentive problem confronting the management layer is how to guide teachers to make greater effort in the scientific work in both periods of their career. There are two types of incentive contracts for the management layer to choose from, that is to repeatedly implement the incentive contract under one-period moral hazard mentioned in the above section or to carry out tenure incentive contract. We introduce faculty tenure into our model, dividing the career of teachers into two periods: pretenure period and tenure period. All college teachers have to work hard so as to obtain the qualification of teachers with tenure. The pre-tenure period is regarded as a probation period and teachers with excellent performance in scientific work are qualified as tenure teaching positions while those with poor scientific performance are to be fired. Rational management layer will inevitably choose the incentive contract with lower costs. We will then prove hereafter that compared with the optimal incentive contract under singleperiod moral hazard, the management layer under Tenure contracts confronts a trade-off between the benefits from income smoothing and the excess burden led by induced high level of effort in the second period. On the one hand, the Tenure contracts lead to the income smoothing of college English teachers and a reduction of incentive wages for scientific research in the first period of teachers" career(pretenure period). On the other hand, the management layer has to pay much more to stimulate college English teachers with tenure to work hard in scientific research.
According to the analyses above, we can describe the game between the management layer and college English teachers under tenure contracts as follows: at the beginning of the pre-tenure period, the management layer of colleges sign a long-run contract, determining the terminal wages and the conditions for a teaching position with tenure; at the end of the pre-tenure period, the management layer pays teachers 1h W and reward them a position with tenure if the observed scientific output of the teacher is H while pays 1l W and fire the teacher provided the observed scientific output is L ; at the end of the second period, if the observed scientific output is H , the teacher is paid 2h W , otherwise 2l W .
Therefore, the principal (the management layer) have to solve the following programming problem so as to induce the teachers to provide high level of effort in both periods under repeated moral hazard game: 
Where (IR) represents the participating constraint of college English teachers, (IC1) and (IC2) represent the incentive comparability constraint in the pre-tenure period and tenure period respectively.
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, then the programming problem
Proposition 2.
Under tenure system, the incentive intensity must be strengthened so as to make college English teachers work hard in scientific research in the tenure period.
Proof: According to equation (6) ,
, indicating that college English teachers must be paid a high incentive wage to work hard under repeated moral hazard, which is coordinated with our intuition. In our model, the qualification of teaching position with tenure is defined as a minimum wage guarantee on the reserved wage, and teachers with tenure will be paid 2 D l W even they do not work hard in the tenure period.
Therefore, the principal (the management layer) has to pay a higher incentive wage 2
D h
W to stimulate those with tenure positions to work hard in the tenure period. According to Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, the management layer confronts a trade-off between the benefits from income smoothing and the excess burden led by inducing high level of endeavor in the second period (tenure period). In fact, we can compare the expected costs of the principal (the management layer) in the above two cases (single-period moral hazard & repeated moral hazard).
In the case of tenure contract, the expected payment by the college management layer is: 
